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I. INTRODUCTION
An essential cornerstone of our American legal system is equality and
justice to individuals under the law.' The United States Supreme Court has
achieved this goal by continuously holding that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal
is a basic requirement of due process."2 This concept has stood for the prem-
* J.D. Candidate 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center; B.S
in Business Management 2005, University of Florida. The author wishes to thank: her family;
her colleagues at NOVA LAW REvIEw; and the faculty of the Law Center especially Professor
Olympia Duhart and Professor Debra Moss Curtis, for their inspiration and guidance.
1. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 20 (1994).
2. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509 (1971) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955)) (quotations omitted).
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ise that "[a] judge [will] perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice."3
This important principal has been a major cornerstone of the judiciary since
the beginning of common law.4 There are two fundamental principals that
the law of judicial disqualification rests upon; first, "no-one should be a
judge in his own cause,"5 and second, "Lord Hewart's famous maxim that
justice should not only be done 'but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to
be done,' [which] is evidence of the intimate relationship between judicial
impartiality and the legitimacy of the legal system."6
The law of the United States has since developed and now both indi-
vidualized states and the national government have created codes that govern
judicial conduct.' The governing codes are the United States Code of Judici-
ary and Judicial Procedure and the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that
was adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates in
1972,8 stating under what circumstances a judge shall be disqualified for his
or her failure to apply the law impartially9 and diligently. ° In 1990, the
ABA revised the Code of Judicial Conduct "creating a prohibition on sexual
orientation bias in Canon 3," resulting in several states specifically prohibit-
ing judicial bias based on sexual orientation." Although many of these rules
clearly put the world on notice as to when judicial disqualification or recusal
3. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5). "The Code of Judicial Conduct establishes
standards for ethical conduct of judges." Id. pmbl. The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct's
preamble states that:
[t]he Code of Judicial Conduct is not intended as an exhaustive guide for the conduct of
judges. They should also be governed in their judicial and personal conduct by general ethical
standards. The Code is intended, however, to state basic standards which should govern the
conduct of all judges and to provide guidance to assist judges in establishing and maintaining
high standards of judicial and personal conduct.
Id.
4. Kate Malleson, Safeguarding Judicial Impartiality, 22 LEGAL STUD. 53, 53 (2002)
[hereinafter Malleson, Judicial Impartiality].
5. Kate Malleson, Judicial Bias and Disqualification After Pinochet (No. 2), 63 MOD. L.
REv. 119, 120 (2000).
6. Malleson, Judicial Impartiality, supra note 4, at 53 (quoting The King v. Sussex
Justices, (1924) 1 K.B. 256, 259).
7. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000); FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; MODEL CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT (2004).
8. William C. Duncan, Sexual Orientation Bias: The Substantive Limits of Ethics Rules,
11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 85, 86-87 (2003); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pref-
ace (2004). The Model Code of Judicial Conduct has been adopted by the vast majority of
states with slight variation in certain jurisdictions. See Duncan, supra, at 87.
9. Impartially is defined as "without bias." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (8th ed.
2004).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; see also FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3.
11. Duncan, supra note 8, at 87.
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is appropriate, 2 one rule is not as clear, and that is whether a judge in Florida
should be disqualified or recused from a case because of his or her sexual
orientation, when sexual orientation is the main issue at stake.
This note will examine cases, governing rules of law, statutes, articles,
and journals that have surrounded this topic, and suggest whether judicial
recusal based on sexual orientation is expected or appropriate. The primary
purpose of this note is to determine whether society throughout the State of
Florida expects judicial recusal or disqualification based on a judge's sexual
orientation. The first section of this note will begin by explaining the general
laws concerning judicial disqualification and recusal. This section will ex-
plain the challenges that judges are constantly facing concerning motions for
disqualification, ethical responsibilities, and the expectations placed upon
each judge by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. This section is separated
into three subsections that thoroughly explain the rules governing automatic
disqualification, motions filed by parties seeking judicial disqualification,
and the legal sufficiency of these motions. The subsection concerning the
sufficiency of motions filed by parties against judges explains what motions
warrant disqualification and what motions are deemed insufficient by law.
Next, this note will explain the general principles of judicial disqualifi-
cation and recusal throughout the nation. This section will explain the rele-
vancy of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and Title 28 of the United
States Code concerning judicial disqualification and recusal. This section
also discusses a recent challenge an Oregon Supreme Court Justice, Rives
Kistler, faced when determining whether his sexual orientation presented a
conflict of interest warranting recusal.
The next section in this note will thoroughly explain Florida's law con-
cerning judicial disqualification and recusal based on case law, statutes, and
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct. This section is broken down into four
subsections, each one explaining an important aspect of judicial recusal. The
first subsection is further broken down in order to more thoroughly explain
what is deemed as judicial bias towards an individual person, compared to
what is deemed as judicial bias towards a subject matter. Next, this note will
provide the author's closing remarks on judicial disqualification and recusal
based on the research concerning this topic. Finally, it will be concluded that
based on case law, statutes, articles, and journals concerning the topic of
judicial recusal and disqualification, Florida does not expect a judge to be
disqualified nor recused based on a judge's sexual orientation, even when
sexual orientation is the main issue in the proceeding.
12. See id. at 88.
2008]
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II. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The issue of judicial bias is continuously leveled at judges, whether in
the form of an attorney filing for judicial disqualification, or the media writ-
ing about a judge's bias towards a person, subject matter, or case.13 When an
attorney decides to move for judicial disqualification based on a valid allega-
tion concerning the potential violation of a particular judicial cannon, there
are many serious consequences that can result in the handling of the attor-
ney's case.'4 The "attorney moving for judicial disqualification on the
ground of bias risks alienating a judge before whom [he or] she must present
[his or] her case should the motion be denied."' 5 "[R]ecusal motion[s] pre-
sent[] difficult challenges for" attorneys involved, parties, and the judge who
has been accused of being incapable of acting impartially. 6 By filing this
motion, the moving party seeking disqualification of a judge, on the basis of
bias or prejudice, will ultimately bear the burden of persuasion. 7
In Florida, the procedures for filing a motion for judicial disqualifica-
tion, for both civil and criminal cases, are outlined in Rules 2.310"8 and
2.3309 of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. The other bodies of
law that govern judicial disqualification are Florida Statutes section 38.1020
and the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3.2 There are several other
statutory provisions that provide a mechanism for judicial disqualification,
such as Florida Statutes sections 38.01,22 38.02,23 and 38.05.4 Florida laws
13. See Charles Malarkey, Note, Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation Cause
in California?, 41 HASTINGS L.J 695, 695 (1990).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 696.
16. Frank M. McClellan, Judicial Impartiality & Recusal: Reflections on the Vexing
Issue of Racial Bias, 78 TEMEP. L. REv. 351, 355 (2005). When a motion for judicial disquali-
fication is filed by an attorney "[t]he judge's first reaction ... is likely to be one of indignation
... [which can insult] someone who has taken an oath to resolve disputes impartially [by
alleging that he or] she cannot fulfill the oath in a particular case." Id.
17. City of Hollywood v. Witt, 868 So. 2d 1214, 1217 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(noting that the moving party will have the burden of proving that he or she has a "well-
founded fear of not receiving a fair trial" and that bias is legally sufficient to disqualify the
judge from the case).
18. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.310 (stating the rules regarding "Judicial Discipline, Removal,
Retirement, and Suspension" ofjudicial officers).
19. FLA. R. JuD. ADMiN. 2.330. Rule 2.330 was formerly Rule 2.160. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (2007). Section 38.10 provides the process for judicial disqualifi-
cation. Id.
21. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3E.
22. FLA. STAT. § 38.01 (stating disqualification of a judge is appropriate when a judge is a
party to the pending action).
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on judicial disqualification are similar to other jurisdictions, except for one
way "in which Florida is very different."25 "Whereas judges in most jurisdic-
tions are not penalized for commenting on, or responding to, motions which
have been brought to disqualify them, when a Florida judge has been chal-
lenged, he or she may generally do no more than rule upon the legal suffi-
ciency of the disqualification motion. '26 If the judge violates this rule "by
taking issue with the moving party's allegations, [judicial] disqualification..
may be mandated even when ... disqualification would not have been war-
ranted otherwise. 2 7
A. Automatic Disqualification
Prior to automatic disqualification, "[d]iscretion is confided in the...
judge in the first instance to determine whether [or not] to disqualify him-
self.''2  Once a judge has acted in such a manner where his or her impartial-
ity may be questioned, that judge is required to be immediately recused from
the proceeding. 29 This category of automatic disqualification indicates that
the courts strictly apply the definition of impartiality.3" While each state has
different statutes governing the disqualification of judges, several principals
concerning when a judge should automatically be disqualified are consis-
tent.31 However, when a judge is not automatically disqualified for his or her
bias or prejudice, a party can file a motion seeking judicial disqualification.32
23. Id. § 38.02 (stating when a party may show by a suggestion that the challenged judge,
or judge's relative, is a party or is otherwise interested in the result of the case, that the judge
is related to one of the attorneys, or that the judge is a material witness). This section states
that if the truth of the suggestion appears from the record, the judge shall disqualify himself or
herself. Id.
24. Id. § 38.05 (authorizing a judge to "disqualify himself or herself' on his or her own
motion when the judge knows of any appropriate grounds for recusal).
25. Richard C. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification in Florida, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1996, at 59.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Jones v. Hirschfeld, 348 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988)).
29. FLA. CODE JuD. CoNDucT Canon 3E(l).
30. Malleson, Judicial Impartiality, supra note 4, at 55.
31. See FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDuCT Canon 3E(1)-(2).
32. See FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.330(b).
20081
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B. Motion for Disqualification
The disqualification of a judge is appropriate as provided by the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct,33 the applicable states' code of judicial conduct,
and the states' statutes.34 The motion to disqualify a judge must: "(1) be in
writing; (2) specifically allege the facts [that indicate] . . .the grounds for
[judicial] disqualification; and 3) be sworn to by the party by signing the
motion under oath or by a separate affidavit."35 The filing of this motion
must be within a reasonable amount of time, not exceeding "[ten] days after
discovery of the facts constituting the grounds for the motion and shall be
promptly presented to the court for an immediate ruling."36 Motions made
during the course of a trial are based on the facts discovered throughout the
trial. 37 Failure of a party to comply with the requirements of Rule 2.330 is a
sufficient ground for denying a party's motion for disqualification.38
C. Sufficiency of Motion
Once the motion has been properly filed, according to the statutory pro-
cedures required, the "sufficiency of the motion" will be closely examined in
order to determine whether judicial disqualification is appropriate. 39 Florida
law measures the legal sufficiency of a motion based on whether "a reasona-
bly prudent person [would] have a well-grounded fear that he or she will not
receive a fair and impartial trial from the judge." '4 The grounds for judicial
disqualification must present:
(1) that the party fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or
hearing because of specifically described prejudice or bias of the
judge; or
33. See MODEL CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E (2004).
34. See FLA. STAT. § 38.01 (2007).
35. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.330(c)(1)-(3) (emphasis added). Case law clearly indicates
that if the motion is not signed by the party seeking disqualification, the motion will be
deemed as legally insufficient. Gaines v. State, 722 So. 2d 256, 256 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
36. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.330(e).
37. Id. (stating that such trial motions "may be stated on the record," filed in writing, and
immediately ruled upon).
38. See Douglas J. Glaid, Judicial Disqualification: What Every Practitioner (and
Judge) Should Know, FLA. B.J., Oct. 2000, at 28, 32.
39. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.330(f).
40. Flamm, supra note 25, at 58.
[Vol. 32
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(2) that the judge before whom the case is pending, or some person
related to said judge by consanguinity or affinity... is a party the-
reto or interested in the result thereof, or that said judge is related
to an attorney or counselor of record.., or that said judge is a ma-
terial witness for or against one of the parties to the cause.41
The legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify a judge is a pure ques-
tion of law, meaning that if the motion is legally sufficient, then the truth of
the substance alleged is irrelevant.42 This requires the court to view the mo-
tion from the perspective of the litigant, rather than from the perspective of
the judge.43 What the judge feels is not a question that is taken into consid-
eration when examining the sufficiency of the motion, and rather, it is the
"'feeling [that] resides in the affiant's mind, and the basis for such feel-
ing.""
44
Once an initial motion for disqualification has been filed against a
judge, the judge must then only determine "the legal sufficiency of the mo-
tion and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged. '45 This may require a
judge to "immediately enter an order granting disqualification and proceed
no further in the action;" however, if the motion is insufficient, the judge
must immediately enter "an order denying the motion. 4 6 If a recommenda-
tion has been made to the Judicial Qualifications Commission, rather than a
litigant filing a motion for disqualification, the commission will then deter-
mine whether or not the recommended action is appropriate. 47 If the com-
mission determines that removal is appropriate, an order shall be issued "di-
recting the justice or judge to show just cause in writing why the recom-
mended action should not be taken."'  This process allows a judge to re-
spond to the commission by filing his or her response showing why he or she
41. FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.330(d).
42. See Jimenez v. Ratine, 954 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The legal
sufficiency is based on the premise of "whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably
prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial." MacKenzie v. Super Kids
Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So.
2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
43. Jimenez, 954 So. 2d at 708 (explaining that the judge's impartiality is questioned
rather than his or her ability to act impartially and fairly).
44. Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State
v. Dewell, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (Fla. 1938)) (emphasis added).
45. FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.330(f).
46. Id.
47. See FLA. R. JuD. ADMIN. 2.310(b).
48. Id.
2008]
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should not be removed from the proceeding before the commission makes its
final decision. 9
III. PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL RECUSAL & DISQUALIFICATION
"The Code of Judicial Conduct demands that judges conform to a high-
er standard of conduct than is expected of lawyers or other persons in soci-
ety."5 This higher standard that judges are held to has led to the enactment
of statutes concerning judicial conduct and numerous guides to judicial eth-
ics. 1 Congress' goal when enacting judicial recusal statutes was to, first,
preserve the role of judges as neutral parties, and second, to preserve soci-
ety's perception of judges as neutral parties.52 The purpose of these statutes
requiring judicial recusal and disqualification are "'to promote confidence in
the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever pos-
sible."'53 The importance of a judge remaining a neutral party was based on
"[t]he basic tenet for [judicial] disqualification [that] 'justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice."'54 This basic tenet has been the backbone of our judi-
cial branch of government, and "must [still] be followed even when the re-
cord lacks any actual bias or prejudice."55
Currently, every state has different statutes governing judicial recusal
and disqualification for state and federal judges within that state. 6 Many of
the concepts used by various state statutes are reflected in the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, which was "designed to provide guidance to judges and
candidates for judicial office and to provide a structure for regulating con-
duct through disciplinary agencies. 57 There are currently two conditions for
judicial disqualification that have been established by Title 28 section 455 of
49. Id. (stating that "the commission may serve a reply [to the judge's written response]
within 20 days from service of the response").
50. State v. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Neb. 1998).
51. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT; 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
52. Jay Hall, The Road Less Traveled: The Third Circuit's Preservation of Judicial
Impartiality in an Imperfect World, 50 VILL. L. REv. 1265, 1278 (2005). Congress has sought
to maintain impartial judges by requiring judicial disqualification in various situations. See 28
U.S.C. § 455(a)-(c).
53. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)).
54. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp. v. Cassone, 807 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (quoting Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
55. See id. at 143.
56. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT pmbl.
57. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (2004); see also FLA. CODE JuD. CONDUCT
pmbl.
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the United States Code." First, section 455(a) provides that a judge "shall
disqualify himself [or herself] in any proceeding in which his [or her] impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned. 59  Under section 455(a), judicial
recusal is only appropriate if "'an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully
informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality. '6 Next,
section 455(b) provides that a judge shall also be disqualified "[w]here he [or
she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowl-
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.' In order for
this bias to qualify as a sufficient basis for judicial recusal, "[t]he judge's
bias [or prejudice] must be personal and extrajudicial," meaning that it must
have derived from something besides what "the judge [has] learned by par-
ticipating in the case. 62
Judicial recusal is required, based on the Code of Judicial Conduct, in
cases where a judge is proven to be biased or when failure of a judge to re-
cuse himself or herself would result in a void decision being rendered.63 A
party moving for judicial disqualification "on the basis of bias or prejudice
[has] the heavy burden of [rebutting] the presumption of judicial impartial-
ity."64 Rebuttal of this presumption is especially difficult because this mo-
tion is purely a question of law; therefore, all allegations made are taken to
be true and only the judge's impartiality is questioned.65 Ultimately, in order
for a motion for judicial disqualification to be deemed appropriate, the facts
alleged "must be 'germane to the judge's undue bias, prejudice or sympa-
thy. ' 6
6
58. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (2000).
59. Id. § 455(a).
60. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (quoting Parker v. Con-
nors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988)).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
62. McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11 th Cir. 1990).
63. See MODEL CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (2004); see also FLA. CODE JUD.
CONDUCT Canon 3E(1).
64. State v. Pattno, 579 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Neb. 1998).
65. See MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1334-35 (Fla.
1990) (questioning the legal sufficiency of whether a reasonable person would fear receiving
an impartial trial).
66. Hous. Auth. of Tampa v. Burton, 873 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(quoting Dragovich v. State, 492 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. 1986)).
2008]
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A. When Disqualification or Recusal Is Inappropriate
The Code of Judicial Conduct, statutes, and case law state under what
circumstances judicial recusal and disqualification are appropriate and under
what circumstances judicial recusal and disqualifications are inappropriate.67
The case law concerning judicial disqualification and recusal tends to dem-
onstrate clearly under what circumstances the court should deny a party's
motion for judicial disqualification.68 Case law indicates that a judge's rul-
ings or opinions are insufficient to justify recusal, absent clear judicial bias
or favoritism that would render a fair decision impossible.69 Generally, a
judge's manifestation of annoyance, impatience, and even anger is not
enough to constitute bias sufficient to warrant a recusal motion.7 ° In Florida,
a judge is also allowed to form opinions and mental impressions throughout
a proceeding without being disqualified from the case, so long as the judge's
opinions do not lead to prejudgment of the case. 7' The objective person
standard that is used by courts throughout the nation, including Florida, re-
quires all doubts to be resolved in the favor of judicial disqualification or
recusal.72 Meaning that even if the factors do not clearly indicate there have
been substantial grounds for disqualification, courts tend to use the safer
approach in order to protect the parties involved and the integrity of the judi-
ciary.7
3
A judge has no "duty to recuse himself [or herself based] on unsup-
ported speculation., 74 The fact that a judge may also be familiar with the
facts of a case is also insufficient grounds for recusal or disqualification.75
Recusal has also been inappropriate when "characterizations and gratuitous
comments" that can, or have been, offensive to litigants have been made by
judges during a proceeding. 76 These instances, where a judge's comments or
67. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
68. See Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp
155, 158-59 (E.D. Pa. 1974). This case outlines the law of judicial disqualification, also
explaining the importance of examining the legal sufficiency of parties' motions for judicial
disqualification. Id.
69. See Jones v. Hirschfeld, 348 F. Supp. 2d 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
70. Id.
71. Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
72. See United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
73. See id.
74. Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D. Kan. 1996).
75. Id. at 1088.
76. Wargo, 669 So. 2d at 1124. The court has also held that remarks made by judges
during trial that are disapproving, hostile, or critical to any party or witness involved in the
proceeding are generally insufficient grounds for judicial disqualification. United States v.
Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1118 (D.N.J. 1994).
[Vol. 32
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behavior have been insufficient grounds for recusal or disqualification, indi-
cate that the Code of Judicial Conduct, case law, and statutes strictly govern
what a judge can say or do in the courtroom; however, there are certain cir-
cumstances where a judge's actions may offend a particular party in a pro-
ceeding, but fall short of satisfying the reasonable person standard required
for judicial recusal and disqualification.77
B. Recent Issues Within the Courtroom: Judicial Recusal Based on Sexual
Orientation
The issue of a judge's sexual orientation and judicial recusal was a
question that one of Oregon's Supreme Court Justices recently faced when a
case concerning same-sex marriage was brought before the court in 2004.8
Oregon Supreme Court Justice Rives Kistler, an openly homosexual member
of Oregon's highest court, did not want to jeopardize the future judgment of
the case and, therefore, decided to stop all of his involvement and determine
whether there was a potential conflict of interest.79 Justice Kistler consulted
with both a judicial ethics book and the judicial ethics panel in order to de-
termine whether being homosexual presented a conflict of interest. 80 After
being advised that there was no conflict of interest, he joined the majority
decision ruling "that same-sex marriages were not allowed" in Oregon.8'
The outcome of these circumstances proved that, in Oregon, a judge's sexual
orientation was not ground for judicial recusal even when sexual orientation
was the premise of the proceeding.82 This principal became more clear when
the citizens of Oregon supported that notion by electing Justice Kistler the
following year in a statewide election.83 The premise of this situation exem-
plified the issue that a homosexual judge may have to question whether or
not by ruling on a case concerning sexual orientation, the appearance of a
bias decision or a conflict of interest may be presented.84
77. See MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1334-35 (Fla.
1990).
78. Joan Biskupic, Amid Debate over Rights, Number of Gay Judges Rising, USA
TODAY, Oct. 18, 2006, at A5.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Biskupic, supra note 78.
84. See id. (suggesting that a judge may have to question whether the public will perceive
his or her decision as bias or prejudice based on his or her sexual orientation).
2008]
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IV. FLORIDA LAW: CURRENT POLICIES CONCERNING JUDICIAL RECUSAL &
DISQUALIFICATION
Currently, Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct requires judicial recusal
when a judge discriminates "on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national
origin. [However, m]embership in a fraternal, sororal, religious, or ethnic
heritage organization shall not be deemed to be a violation., 85 Therefore, in
Florida, a judge's involvement or membership in certain groups, such as eth-
nic heritage organizations, will not be sufficient grounds for judicial disquali-
fication although a case may involve the rights of that group.86
Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct currently does not mention what a
judge is expected to do when faced with a potential conflict of interest based
on his or her sexuality.87 Over the recent years, the number of homosexuals
seeking enforcement of their civil rights has dramatically increased, leading
to more cases concerning the issue of sexual orientation being heard
throughout courtrooms worldwide.8  The recent increase of homosexual
judges throughout the nation suggests that the issue of judicial recusal and
disqualification based on sexual orientation will also increase throughout the
state.89
A. Actual Bias and Prejudice
The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, clearly states that one of its pri-
mary goals is to "avoid... impropriety and the appearance of impropriety"
in all of the judge's activities,90 further stating that "[a] judge shall respect
and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."9' Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of an un-biased
judiciary by providing that "[a] judge shall perform the [d]uties of [j]udicial
[o]ffice [i]mpartially and [d]iligently. ''92 This canon stresses the importance
of a judge's judicial duties and adjudicative responsibilities to the court of
law in which the judge represents. 93 Canon 3B(5) states that:
85. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.
86. See id.
87. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
88. See generally Biskupic, supra note 78.
89. See id.
90. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2.
91. Id. Canon 2A.
92. Id. Canon 3.
93. See id.
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[a] judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bi-
as or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, dis-
ability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, and shall
not permit staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge's
direction and control do so. This section does not preclude the
consideration of race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or other similar factors
when they are issues in the proceeding.
94
The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct also provides a list of instances
when "[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," 95 for example,
when "the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a par-
ty's lawyer ... ." Statements made by judges can also be sufficient
grounds for disqualification if the remarks or statements demonstrate that a
judge may have or has prejudiced the case.97
In addition to the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, the Florida Stat-
utes and case law provide that a judge shall be disqualified if "the party fears
that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically
described prejudice or bias of the judge."98 These bodies of law stress the
importance of judges performing judicial duties fairly and impartially in or-
der to prevent "bring[ing] the judiciary into disrepute."99 These ethical stan-
dards imposed on judges have been tremendously stressed at the state and
federal level, requiring recusal in cases where a judge is actually biased to-
wards the parties involved, or the subject matter of the proceeding."°° Case
law clearly indicates that in order for a judge to not be deemed biased, the
judge must not only be impartial but also leave an impression of impartiality
to all who attended court. 10 1
Although on its face it may seem that only one type of judicial bias ex-
ists, there are several types of bias that can occur throughout a proceeding
that would require immediate disqualification.'02 Before taking a closer ex-
94. Id Canon 3B(5).
95. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E(l).
96. Id. Canon 3E(l)(a).
97. Glaid, supra note 38, at 32.
98. FLA. R. Jun. ADMIN. 2.330(d)(1).
99. See FLA. CODE JuD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) cmt.
100. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
101. See Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
102. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
2008]
13
Alempour: Judicial Recusal & Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation a Vali
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
amination of the concept of judicial bias based on a judge's sexual orienta-
tion, a distinction should be made between the various types of bias.
1. Bias Toward the Party
In State v. Pattno,103 the defendant filed an appeal alleging that the rul-
ing judge was bias against his sexual orientation as evidenced by the judge
expressing his religious views when reading a passage from the Bible during
the defendant's sentencing." On appeal, the court found that "because the
trial judge interjected his own religious views immediately prior to sentenc-
ing, a reasonable person could conclude that the sentence was based upon the
personal bias or prejudice of the judge."'' 5 The biblical passage that was
read prior to the defendant's sentencing clearly indicated that the judge con-
sidered the defendant's sexual orientation when reaching the sentence.
10 6
The appellate court ruled that the defendant was deprived of both due proc-
ess and the impartiality of the judge when the judge imposed a sentence that
was based on his prejudice of the defendant's sexual orientation.0 7
Judicial bias ordinarily must be directed towards a specific individual;
however, certain jurisdictions do not require that the alleged bias be personal
or directed towards a specific person.0 8 In these jurisdictions, such as Flor-
ida, a judge's negative feelings towards a specific class, such as an ethnic or
religious group, may constitute bias towards individual parties that belong to
that specific class.'0 9 In Baskin v. Brown,110 the contrary perspective to juris-
dictions like Florida was established, here the court made it clear that "[a]
judge cannot be disqualified merely because he believes in upholding the law
... [a] [p]ersonal bias against a party must be shown.'
The critical question surrounding whether a judge or justice is biased
toward a person or class of persons is whether there is sufficient bias that
103. 579 N.W.2d 503 (Neb. 1998).
104. Id. at 506.
105. Id. at 509 (holding that a judge who injects his or her personal beliefs as a basis for a
ruling "injects an impermissible consideration in the [ruling] process").
106. Id.
107. Id. at 508.
108. CTR. FOR CONTINUING EDUC., DISQUALIFICATION FOR BIAS OR ITS APPEARANCE: SELF
STUDY ARTICLE & SELF ASSESSMENT TEST § 4.5, http://www.cce-mcle.com/tests/ss60l4a.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
109. Id.
110. 174F.2d391 (4thCir. 1949).
111. Id. at 394 (holding that the defendants grounds to disqualify a judge after the judge
refused to recuse himself from a case was not sufficient because the judge did not have a
personal bias against the defendants or the particular class of persons in this case).
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would prevent the judge from being fair and impartial when ruling on the
case as outlined by the Code of Judicial Conduct."2 This critical question of
"whether the statements or activities [of the judge] would suggest to the rea-
sonable man that the judge's bias against a class would give rise to a per-
sonal bias against a party in court who is a member of that class" must be
determined prior to deciding whether a judge should recuse himself or her-
self or be disqualified from a case. l"3
There are many cases where the bias of a judge is based on "the judges'
conduct, specifically, statements made by the judges themselves indicating a
bias against the classes to which the parties [or party] belonged.""..4 This
varies significantly with bias that is based on a judge's sexual orientation,
sex, race, religion, or ethnicity." 5 Florida's current Code of Judicial Conduct
specifically prohibits a judge from being biased or prejudiced based on a
party's race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, age, national origin,
or disability." 6 With this concept in mind, the same consideration should
also be given to a "judge's sexual orientation, which, in the absence of con-
duct or other circumstances to indicate bias toward a party, similarly should
not be a ground for disqualification."
'
"
17
2. Bias Toward the Subject Matter
"[B]ias, as to the subject matter of a case, can [also] compromise the
impartiality of a judge" and may also be sufficient grounds for judicial dis-
qualification."' "The concept of bias toward [the] subject matter, as used
here, poses difficult questions regarding the types of preconceptions that are
permissible in the mind of the trial judge, and those that are not."" 9 Gener-
ally, judges can develop mental impressions and personal opinions through-
out the course of evidence presentations, so long as the judge "does not pre-
judge the case."' 2 ° In Williams v. Reed,'2 the defendant filed for appeal chal-
lenging the judge's decision after ordering a transfer of primary physical
112. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5).
113. Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 736, 756 (1973).
114. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 706.
115. Id.
116. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5).
117. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 706.
118. Id. at 706.
119. Id. at 706-07.
120. Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting
Brown v. Pate, 577 So. 2d 645, 647 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
121. 6 S.W.3d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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custody of the party's minor child to defendant's former husband/plaintiff. 22
The defendant appealed the judge's ruling, claiming that the trial court erred
when denying her motion for judicial disqualification. 23 The defendant ar-
gued that the judge's comments and conduct throughout the proceeding to-
ward the defendant, based on her sexual orientation, clearly demonstrated
grounds for disqualification.'24 The judge's comments and conduct were
argued to have stemmed from his own personal bias towards the subject mat-
ter of same-sex relationship child custody issues. 25 This type of subject mat-
ter bias clearly demonstrates how a fixed anticipatory judgment can taint or
prejudice a proceeding, resulting in an impartial decision being made based
on a fixed belief regarding the subject matter of a case.'26
The argument of a judge being biased toward a subject matter often is
based on a judge's membership in a minority group; however, "membership
in a minority group [should] not, in itself, indicate [a] greater likelihood" of a
judge deciding on a particular issue in any particular manner. 27 A judge
who abides by the rules outlined in the Code of Judicial Conduct should dis-
qualify himself or herself in the event that he or she feels they would be "in-
capable of detached judgment.' ' 128 Ultimately, a judge's religion, race, sex,
ethnicity, or sexual orientation is not sufficient grounds to infer the appear-
ance of bias or actual bias, and therefore should not warrant disqualifica-
tion.'29 An attorney seeking judicial disqualification based on a judge's
"sexual orientation should be required to show specific examples of the
judge's conduct or other circumstances to support [his or] her charge.' 30
Stereotyping judges based on the preconception that a judge will be
more likely to have bias or prejudice towards a litigant, attorney, or witness,
based on his or her memberships, damages society's confidence in the judi-
ciary."' The judiciary as a whole includes members of various minorities,
including heterosexual, and homosexual judges; therefore, if we are to clas-
122. Id. at 918.
123. Id.
124. Id. ("[The] judge's conduct and statements during the hearing on Ms. Reed's motion
for change of judge would give a reasonable person a factual basis to doubt the judge's ability
to thereafter preside as a neutral arbiter ... ").
125. See id. at 919 (explaining that the judge in this case was personally involved in a
similar situation regarding same-sex relationships and child custody issues concerning his ex-
wife and minor child).
126. See Williams, 6 S.W.3d at 918-19.
127. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 708.
128. Id. at 709.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 714.
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sify judges as being bias or prejudice because of their involvement in a mi-
nority group, such as alternative sexual orientation, that premise would have
to be applied fairly across all groups, meaning that a judge's involvement in
a minority group, such as ethnicity, should also be grounds for disqualifica-
tion. 3 '
B. Appearance of Bias
Ethical standards and statutory law require a judge to not only remove
himself or herself from "any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality
might reasonably be questioned," but also to avoid any appearance of bias.133
The premise of avoiding the appearance of any bias also comes from "[t]he
basic tenet for [judicial] disqualification [that] '[j]ustice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice.""34 In order for judges "[t]o maintain public confidence
in the judicia[ry]," judges must not only apply the law impartially but must
also appear to do so as well.135 The appearance of impartiality must be used
as the general standard for judicial recusal and when applying this standard
judges should determine whether their impartiality may be questioned from
the perspective of a reasonable person.'36 Although this standard varies
slightly by each jurisdiction, the implications of its appropriateness are con-
sistent.1
37
The appearance of bias or impropriety may derive from a judge's con-
duct during an issue or proceeding, or remarks made to parties involved or to
witnesses.'38 This appearance of impropriety can also come from judicial
frustration, such as when a judge chooses to speak, "[a] judge's attitude to-
132. See Malarkey, supra note 13, at 713-14.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000). Society and the governing rules of law demand that a
judge not only recuse himself or herself when there is reason to do so, but judges also have an
equal responsibility to do so when a reasonable person would harbor doubts concerning the
judges impartiality. Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 924 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D. Kan.
1996).
134. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp. v. Cassone, 807 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (quoting Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
135. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 710.
136. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining
that when a judge is facing possible disqualification, the judge should consider how his impar-
tiality appears "to the average person on the street," meaning that disqualification is appropri-
ate if a reasonable person were "to know all the circumstances" and would doubt the judge's
impartiality). Id.
137. Smith v. Pepsico, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 524, 526 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
138. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impar-
tiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned, " 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 55, 76 (2000).
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ward an attorney practicing in the judge's court[room]," and a judge's busi-
ness or personal relationships.1 39 In United States v. Salemme," 4 the court
reiterated the standard for recusal concerning the appearance of impartiality
as an objective standard, as outlined in section 455 of the United States
Code. 1' The court also stated that the decision of disqualification can even
occur when a "judge is not actually biased or prejudiced," as long as his "im-
partiality might reasonably be questioned. 1 42 This concept is seen through-
out many cases both on the state and federal level, highlighting the impor-
tance of an impartial and fair judiciary. 43 In Salemme, the court thoroughly
explained the importance of this standard and why:
[t]he disqualification decision must reflect not only the need to se-
cure public confidence through proceedings that appear impartial,
but also the need to prevent parties from too easily obtaining the
disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the
system for strategic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to
their liking.144
This concept of "judge-shopping"'145 is frequently used by parties and at-
torneys when an argument can be made as to the appearance of impropriety
and a new judge would be more favorable to one or more of the parties in-
volved. 46 Courts disfavor this use of disqualification and recusal motions
because these motions cannot be used by litigants as strategies to "judge-
shop" and rather should only successfully be used when there is the appear-
ance of or actual judicial impropriety. 41
139. Id. at 85. The comment to Canon 3B(5) states:
A judge who manifests bias on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding
and brings the judiciary into disrepute. Facial expression and body language, in addition to
oral communication, can give to parties or lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media and
others an appearance ofjudicial bias. A judge must be alert to avoid behavior that may be per-
ceived as prejudicial.
FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) cmt.
140. 164 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Mass. 1998).
141. Id. at 80; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
142. Salemme, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
143. See id. at 81.
144. Id. at 52.
145. United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975, 1120 (D.N.J. 1994).
146. See Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776, 779-80
(D.N.M. 1989) ("Litigants are entitled to an unbiased judge; not to a judge of their choosing").
147. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. at 1120 (explaining that the defendant's previous attempts to
disqualify the judge for insufficient reasons evidenced his attempt to judge-shop). The bal-
ancing test used to determine whether judicial recusal is appropriate involves balancing two
key factors. Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33, 35-36 (D. Idaho 1979). First, the right for all
litigants to have their case heard and "decided by an impartial tribunal." Id. at 35. Second,
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"[T]he appearance of bias standard theoretically would apply to a
judge's sexual orientation regardless of whether it was a matter of public
knowledge ... ,148 "Clearly, the goal of [section 455] is to foster the ap-
pearance of impartiality... [this concern] also pervades the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, [which] stems
from the recognized need for an unimpeachable judicial system in which the
public has unwavering confidence.' 49  Thus, one can argue that because
undisclosed facts such as a judge's sexual orientation can become public
knowledge at any time, "consideration of facts of which the public may be
unaware is proper under a standard emphasizing appearance."' 50 One can
also argue that the Code of Judicial Conduct should not apply to a judge's
sexual orientation because doubts based on a "homosexual judge's impartial-
ity are reasonable and would be widely held by members of the public of
which homosexuals comprise a decided minority."'' The reasonableness of
doubts concerning a homosexual judge's impartiality requires subjective
determination; however, the premise that a vast majority of people or even a
large minority of people would harbor such thoughts is supported by fact that
a small majority or large minority of society fears homosexuality.'52
C. Extrajudicial Activities
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct clearly states that "[a] [j]udge
[s]hall [r]egulate [e]xtrajudicial [a]ctivities to [m]inimize the [r]isk of
[c]onflict with [j]udicial [d]uties."' 53 This Canon not only restricts the extra-
judicial activities a judge can participate in, but also helps preserve the
"[e]xpression[] of bias or prejudice by a judge" based on the activities he or
she participates in.114 Some of these restrictions imposed on judges by the
Code of Judicial Conduct involve avoiding activities that "cast reasonable
"the presumption of qualification and the policy against allowing litigants to engage in judge-
shopping." Id. at 36.
148. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 711.
149. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980). The case
discussed the fact why the issue of judicial disqualification is such a sensitive issue by ex-
plaining that when a motion for judicial disqualification is filed, the court must assess all of
the facts surrounding the circumstances before determining whether a judge's failure to prop-
erly recuse himself or herself from the proceeding "'was an abuse of sound judicial discre-
tion."' Id.
150. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 711.
151. Id. at 713.
152. See id.
153. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUcT Canon 5.
154. Id. Canon 5A-B cmt.
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doubt on the judge's .. impartiality,"'' 55 regulating activities in order to mi-
nimize a risk of conflict with judicial duties,'56 practicing law,1 7 and refrain-
ing from inappropriate political involvement.'58 "A [j]udge is [e]ncouraged
to [e]ngage in [extrajudicial] [a]ctivities to [i]mprove the [l]aw, the [I]egal
[s]ystem, and the [a]dministration of [j]ustice.', 59 A judge's involvement in
extrajudicial activities is encouraged so long as they don't demean the judici-
ary, interfere with judicial responsibilities, or cast doubt on a judge's impar-
tiality. 6°
Although the Code of Judicial Conduct suggests that a judge's sex, re-
ligion, ethnicity, or race is not sufficient grounds for disqualification alone,16'
case law suggests otherwise. 162 A question worth considering is whether
public self-acknowledgement of a judge's sexual orientation "is [a] type of
extrajudicial activity that is discouraged by the Code of Judicial Conduct.' 163
Unlike race, sex, religion, national origin, and ethnicity, "sexual orientation
has not" historically been characterized as warranting special legal protec-
tion.1 64 If our "system of judicial ethics [must] distinguish between extraju-
dicial activit[ies]" that promote a promising judiciary and those that ad-
versely interfere with judicial responsibility, the consideration of a judge's
personal life in relation to his or her sexual orientation and which group of
extrajudicial activities that falls under must be determined. 65
It has been held that through the First Amendment's "application to the
judiciary, ... a judge's right to freedom of expression and association must
155. Id. Canon 5A(1).
156. Id. Canon 5A(3).
157. Id. Canon 5G.
158. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5C(2).
159. Id. Canon4.
160. Id. Canon 4A(1)-(3). The commentary following Canon 4A states:
A judge is encouraged to participate in activities designed to improve the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice. In doing so, however, it must be understood that expressions
of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's judicial activities, may cast reasonable
doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge. Expressions which may do so in-
clude jokes or other remarks demeaning individuals on the basis of their race, sex, religion, na-
tional origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status.
Id. Canon 4A cmt.
161. See id. Canon 3B(5).
162. See generally Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33, 35-36 (D. Idaho 1979); Pennsyl-
vania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp 155, 157-58 (E.D.
Pa. 1974). In Freeman, the court addressed the factor of judicial reasonableness by explaining
that a judge must not only be alert in order "to avoid the possibility" of having his impartiality
questioned, but also to avoid having litigants fear a judge's impartiality. Freeman, 478 F.
Supp. at 36.
163. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 721 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 699.
165. Id. at 722.
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be balanced against the public's right to an impartial judiciary."'66 Although
there are some situations "where a judge's right to freedom of expression and
association outweighs the need to regulate the conduct in question," such as
when the appearance of judicial impartiality is not threatened. 67 "Certainly,
a restriction on a judge's ability to express himself [or herself] regarding so
personal a matter as sexual orientation raises serious first amendment con-
cerns."' 168 Although judges are far more restricted in forming certain social
relationships that may rise to the appearance of impropriety, it is highly un-
likely that a judge will be required to distance himself or herself from social
and family networks based on his or her sexual orientation in order to protect
public confidence in an impartial judiciary. 69 Therefore:
[t]o hold that a homosexual judge's public acknowledgement of
his [or her] sexual orientation is the type of activity discouraged by
the Code of Judicial Conduct would, in effect, impose a require-
ment of secrecy on the judge, potentially far more damaging to
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary than the open
admission of one's sexual orientation.17
0
V. AUTHOR'S CLOSING REMARKS
America is a society that places high expectations on the impartiality of
its judicial branch of government as a mechanism for protecting the integrity
of the law and also to ensure equality for all citizens. As a country that
prides itself for standing behind the premise of equal protection and civil
rights, we take a step backward when we ask ourselves whether judicial im-
partiality is affected by a judge's personal and private sexual orientation. If
the law places expectations on our judges through Codes of Judicial Con-
duct, ethical regulations, and state and federal statutes, why is it that we
don't assume the same expectation, by accepting the fact that sexual orienta-
tion should not raise sufficient grounds for claiming judicial disqualification?
Ultimately, "[t]he rule of necessity arises from the obvious requirement
that, in a legal proceeding, some judge must sit."'' If we are to question
whether a homosexual judge is prejudiced or biased solely based on his or
her sexual orientation, one should also question a black judge's impartiality
166. STEVEN LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH: ETHIcAL RESTRIcTIONS ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
AcTvrrIEs OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 42 (1984).
167. Id. at 43.
168. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 722-23.
169. Id. at 723.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 717.
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on the basis of race in a proceeding concerning racial discrimination. In
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, '72 this very issue was addressed when the defendants filed a motion for
judicial disqualification based on the racial prejudice of the judge.7 3 Ulti-
mately, the court denied the defendant's motion concluding that just because
"one is black does not mean . . . that he is anti-white.' ' v4 The court also
noted that:
[i]f America is going to have a total rendezvous with justice so that
there can be full equality for blacks, . . . minorities, and women, it
is essential that the "instinct" for double standards be completely
exposed and hopefully, through analysis, those elements of irra-
tionality can be ultimately eradicated. 1
75
Therefore, with this rationale in mind, it cannot be said with certainty that a
homosexual judge will more likely be partial than a heterosexual judge in a
case, involving a homosexual plaintiff and a heterosexual defendant.
Not only is it impractical and insulting to presume that judges are un-
able to set aside their personal beliefs and private views when deciding a
case but it also undermines the strength of the judiciary. It is unfair to ques-
tion a homosexual judge's capability of applying the law fairly and impar-
tially-a principal so embedded in our judiciary-simply because issues
concerning sexual orientation may be raised during the proceeding. If we
demand our judiciary to be blind of our race, sex, ethnicity, sexual orienta-
tion, national origin, and age, why is it that society should be allowed to
openly support a double standard by not providing our judge's that very
same right.
"The sexual orientation of any judge may or may not give him [or her]
insight into the sexual orientation of a party;' ' 176 however, being bias toward
the possibility of a homosexual judge having insight into the sexual orienta-
tion of a party is prejudicial and unfair. It has been noted that "[g]ay and
lesbian judges do not appear to have had a particular impact on gay-rights
172. 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
173. Id. at 162-63. The defendants in this proceeding claimed that the judge was biased
based on a speech the judge had given to a group of black individuals, although the speech
contained no references to the defendant's case. See id. at 157.
174. Id. at 163. The court held that although the judge spoke to the Association for the
Study of Afro-American Life and History, a judge's background and association are insuffi-
cient grounds to sustain a motion for judicial disqualification based on bias or prejudice. Id. at
182.
175. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. at 181.
176. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 725.
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issues;" '177 therefore, society should not expect that by entrusting in our ho-
mosexual judges, they are inadvertently impacting gay-rights issues. Ulti-
mately, society should expect a fair and impartial judiciary free of personal
and professional bias; meaning that we should not question the impartiality
of judges based on discriminatory beliefs such as a judge's sexual orienta-
tion, race, age, or ethnicity.
VI. CONCLUSION
When considering the question of whether the citizens of Florida expect
judicial recusal or disqualification of a state or federal judge simply based on
the judge's sexual orientation, society should consider whether the law al-
lows a judge's personal beliefs or views to affect his or her decision making.
Based on the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Florida Code of Judicial
Conduct, statutes, case law, and ethical regulations, the answer is clearly no.
A judge should never allow his or her own personal beliefs or views, includ-
ing a judge's sexual orientation, to affect his or her decision making once a
judge is dressed in his or her judicial robe, which represents to all in his or
her presence that he or she will uphold the law fairly and impartially.
The Florida Code of Judicial Conduct currently requires judicial recus-
al or disqualification in circumstances where a "judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."' 78 The rules behind preserving judicial impartial-
ity are supported by the important principal that a judge must at all times act
in such "a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and im-
partiality of the judiciary."'1 79
It would be unfortunate if the citizens of the State of Florida based the
impartiality of a state or federal judge on such a personal matter such as sex-
ual orientation. Individuals that have filed motions for judicial disqualifica-
tion claiming judicial bias based solely on a judge's race have continuously
been unsuccessful.' 8° Similarly, individuals that claim judicial bias solely
based on judges religion or age have also been unsuccessful; therefore, those
individuals who wish to file motions for judicial disqualification solely based
on a judge's sexual orientation should also fail.
Ultimately, the best approach towards eliminating judicial bias based on
sexual orientation is through education.
177. Biskupic, supra note 78.
178. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3E(1).
179. Id. Canon 2A.
180. See generally Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. at 155.
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United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that "on the
whole, judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial func-
tions. This is achieved through training, professional habits, self-
discipline, and that fortunate alchemy by which men [and women] are
loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted." As long as the ju-
diciary continues to be made up of men and women of different sexual
orientations, the suggestion that a judge's sexual orientation is likely to af-
fect his impartiality damages the public's confidence in the judicial sys-
tem and places little faith in a judge's ability to perform his [or her] duties
in an impartial manner independent of personal considerations.
181
Society must be educated as to what constitutes actual prejudice and bi-
as that would adversely affect a judge's duty to be impartial and fair in all
proceedings. This concept must be then be compared to the notion of mold-
ing the judicial branch to reflect the personal beliefs society has towards
what they believe is morally right and wrong.
If society was to require judicial recusal based on a judge's sexual ori-
entation, we would be sending the negative message to our judges that in
order to preserve the appearance of impartial decision making, judges are
required to keep secret all aspects of their personal life society may shun
upon. Imposing this burden on our judiciary would not only be unfair, cruel,
and against the notion of equality, but would also send a message to other
states and countries that Florida expects their judiciary to fit a particular
mold and those who do not fit that mold will be subjected to silence and se-
crecy or face disqualification. The disqualification and recusal of judges
should be decided based on a rational application of governing law and ethi-
cal codes "and the same considerations that lead one to conclude that a
judge's race, sex, ethnicity, or religion is not a sufficient basis, in itself, to
infer bias, apply with equal validity to a judge's sexual orientation."'' 2
181. Malarkey, supra note 13, at 714 (quoting Pub. Utils. Comm'n of. the Dist of Colum-
bia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,466 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., declining to participate)).
182. Id. at 725.
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